Godley to Lytton

In compliance with your request I submit for your consideration the following hasty observations on the establishment of a British Colony in North Western America.
There are two points of the most fundamental & vital importance, to be especially kept in mind.
1. That the Government should be carried on, from the very beginning, in harmony with & by means of, the people of the Country, and
2. that the Local Government should be made perfectly aware that it must rely upon itself alone; and that this country is not going to supply it with money (except to an extent strictly limited) or with Military Force.
It is obvious that these two positions are intimately connected, & depend upon each other. If the Government is not virtually self Government it must directly or indirectly depend on the armed support of this country; & on the other hand, if we attempt to supply it with the means of acting independently of the people, we shall fail in the end, but in the meantime we shall secure antagonism between the Government & the people.
The Governor must therefore immediately, for the purpose of securing the consent & concurrence of the people in his measures convene a legislative council. He should have power at once to do this. His council should be elected if possible, & he should have power to cause elections to take place. Some sort of representation, however rude, may be at once established. If however he cannot (for any unforeseen reason, get an elective council at once) he should nominate a legislative council of the leading men among the settlers, the best stump speakers perhaps, in short the men whom the people would send up if they had the power of electing.
While he is getting his council together, he must organize a police force, & proclaim a tariff of customs. To guide him in this, he should be supplied with a suitable tariff, taken say from New Zealand or Australia, to be in force until the legislature changed it. He must also at once fix on a site for a seaport town, survey it, & sell town lots by auction, at a fixed minimum price. From these two sources he will get more money that he will know what to do with, in six months.
Everything should be prepared for him that can be prepared, e.g. A draft of a very simple political constitution, (with franchise &c defined) for submission to his legislature. Draft proclamations for forming electoral districts, for offering land for sale, at a price to be fixed here provisionally. In short, you should leave as little of the technical work as possible to be done when he enters upon his functions. He will have plenty to do besides considering the wording of proclamations, & yet they ought to be well considered. All arrangements made here, including the tariff & land regulations to be of course only provisional, until modified by the local legislature.
The Governor should take with him only a surveying staff, a legal adviser, perhaps a Secretary, & a Judge. The salaries of these officers should be guaranteed for a limited period, say three years. But of all things the most important is to give the Governor no military force. I foresee clearly that if we do, we shall be led from one step to another, into a futile attempt to garrison the country permanently, & govern it in spite of the people. [Editor's note: transcription not yet available for the following pages: 109v and 110r. Transcription resumes on page 110v; see image-scan link in right margin.] It would be better to send out a Governor from home, thoroughly imbued with the sense of the true position he is to occupy & having this impressed on him personally as well as in written instructions.
Above all, I repeat, send no soldiers. Let one company of Sappers (it is quite enough) go without arms, simply as surveyors & road-makers under a well selected officer as Chief Surveyor, & let it be distinctly understood that the whole expense of employing them must be defrayed by the colony, or they will be ordered home at the expiration of six months.
Another matter worth mentioning is that the Governor should avoid most carefully everything tending to draw a distinction between British subjects & aliens. The former will be in a minority of one to twenty at least; and any attempt to invest them with exceptional privileges will necessarily fail, besides producing jealousies & quarrels which could hardly fail to involve ourselves.
It cannot be too often repeated that this colony will not be worth making or keeping if we are to spend money or use force in keeping it. If the people are allowed the entire management of their own affairs, it will remain British; if they find themselves hampered or controlled, they will make it impossible for us to hold.
As regards finance, I would give the Governor credit for a limited sum say £20,000. This & the guarantee of sufficient salaries to the officers I have mentioned should be the entire amount of our pecuniary contribution. I think it will be better to treat the £20,000 (or whatever sum be fixed upon) as a grant & not a loan. A loan might be repudiated which would involve us in attempts to enforce payment in other words hostile collision, & to send one Regiment there for 6 months would cost more independently of ulterior consequences than twice the amount of the loan.
I foresee in the whole matter great difficulty & danger & if false steps be made at the outset indefinite expense & trouble to this country.
I consider it a serious misfortune that the country is ours at all, but as this cannot be helped, the only thing we have to do is to mix ourselves up with it's concerns as little as possible.
I must entreat your pardon for the rough & hasty manner in which this Letter is written. I have indeed hardly had time to read it over.